Stealing Neural Networks via Timing Side Channels by Duddu, Vasisht et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
11
72
0v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Stealing Neural Networks via Timing Side Channels
Vasisht Duddu∗, Debasis Samanta†, D. Vijay Rao‡, Valentina E. Balas§
∗Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology, Delhi, India
†Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India
‡Institute for Systems Studies and Analyses, Delhi, India
§Aurel Vlaicu University of Arad, Arad, Romania
vduddu@tutamail.com, dsamanta@iitkgp.ac.in, doctor.rao.cs@gmail.com, valentina.balas@uav.ro
Abstract—Deep learning is gaining importance in many ap-
plications. However, Neural Networks face several security and
privacy threats. This is particularly significant in the scenar-
ios where Cloud infrastructures deploy a service with Neural
Network models at the back end. Here, an adversary can
extract the Neural Network parameters, infer the regularization
hyperparameter, identify if a data point was part of the training
data, and generate effective transferable adversarial examples
to evade classifiers. This paper shows how a Neural Network
model is susceptible to timing side channel attack. In this paper,
a black box Neural Network extraction attack is proposed by
exploiting the timing side channels to infer the depth of the
network. Although, constructing an equivalent architecture is
a complex search problem, it is shown how Reinforcement
Learning based optimisation can efficiently reduce the search
space and reconstruct optimal substitute architecture close to
the target model. The proposed approach has been tested with
VGG architectures on CIFAR10 data set. It is observed that it is
possible to reconstruct substitute models with test accuracy close
to the target models and the proposed approach is scalable and
independent of type of Neural Network architectures.
Index Terms—Model Extraction Attacks, Timing Side Chan-
nels, Black Box Algorithms, Security, Deep Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, Neural Networks have been successfully employed
to many diversified areas, namely computer vision, natural
language processing and business intelligence [6]. Deep learn-
ing architectures have also been deployed for automating
critical decision making in security applications like national
critical infrastructures, malware and intrusion detection [42].
For various military applications such as unmanned combat
aerial vehicle, automated target recognition and guided missile
systems, the underlying decision making depends on state
of the art deep learning architectures. Banks and financial
services rely on deep learning techniques to process massive
financial data. Autonomous driving has attracted several big
automotive companies like Audi, Tesla and Waymo to invest
billions of dollars into Deep Learning Research.
Designing and engineering Neural Networks for commercial
services requires significant time, money and human effort,
ranging from collection of massive data to fine-tuning the hy-
perparameters of the model for performance improvement. The
commercial value of these models make them an important
intellectual property for companies, due to which the model
attributes such as number of layers, training algorithms and
regularisation hyperparameter, are kept confidential as a black
box. These black box models do not reveal any information
to the service users other than the output predictions for
the corresponding input. This has been commercialised as a
business model by several cloud service providers such as
Google, Amazon, Microsoft and BigML by deploying an end-
to-end infrastructure for using Deep Neural Networks as a
service. In Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) paradigm,
trusted users submit training data to the service providers, who
spend significant resources to design and train high performing
models, deployed for public use on a pay-per-query basis.
Despite its promise, the commercial value of the black box
Neural Networks within MLaaS makes them susceptible to
adversary’s attempts to extract the model functionality, model
attributes, and circumventing the pay-per-query setting of the
service. Given the architecture of Neural Networks, an adver-
sary can further mount various privacy and security attacks like
model inversion [9][14] and membership inference [32][31] to
infer the input and training data instances and generate more
accurate adversarial examples to evade classifiers during test
phase [29]. These attacks violate the privacy of the sensitive
data used for training the models and provide a way for the
adversaries to evade security systems such as malware and
intrusion detection systems thereby forcing to make incorrect
predictions.
A major security question in such a black box setting such
as MLaaS addressed in this paper is Can a weak adversary
in a black box setting efficiently infer target Neural Network
attributes by exploiting side channels with minimum number
of queries? In this work, a novel model extraction attack in
a black box setting is proposed by exploiting timing side
channels and efficiently reconstructing a substitute model
architecture with functionality close to the target model using
a constant number of queries.
Key Challenges in Model Extraction Attacks. Stealing
a Neural Network architecture and its functionality is a
challenging problem owing to the large number of hyperpa-
rameters making brute-force infeasible. The rapid growth of
Neural Network design space has increased the complexity
of architectures making the problem of black-box model
extraction more challenging. In the black box setting as in
MLaaS, the adversary has only access to the output predictions
given input and lacks any knowledge about the model and
the training data. Previously, model extraction attacks have
relied on using input-output relations to identify the decision
boundary of the target model [38][27]. However, such attacks
require significant computational resources and incur a huge
time overhead to search for the substitute model. For instance,
given a prior knowledge about the number of layers and type
of layers in a Neural Network, it still takes 40 GPU days
to search for a simple 7 layer networks architecture [27].
Further, these attacks do not accommodate the state of the art
architectures with complex topologies and skip connections
[18]. While extracting the model, these attacks require large
number of queries which grow with the size of the architecture
making the attacks highly inefficient [25][38]. An alternative
approach for model extraction is to exploit side channels
like power consumption [3], memory access patterns [17][16]
and cache side channel attacks [43][15] to infer target model
attributes. While these attacks give fine grained information
about the target model during execution, the threat model
requires escalated adversary privileges and strong assumptions
like physical access to hardware and shared resources for
processes running on the server.
Proposed Approach. The objective of model extraction at-
tack is to search for a substitute model with similar functional-
ity as the target neural architecture. However, the search space
for the substitute model is very large and complex due to the
large number of hyperparameters in Neural Networks. To make
the search tractable and efficient, the adversary has to reduce
the search space by identifying some of the attributes of the
target Neural Network in a black box setting using minimum
queries. In a black box setting, a weak adversary can obtain the
output prediction corresponding to a given input image. This
paper shows the existence of timing side channels in the black
box setting due to the dependence of the total execution time
of the Neural Network on the total number of layers or depth
of the network. From the total execution time, an adversary can
infer the total number of layers (depth) of the Neural Network
using a regressor trained on the data containing the variation
of execution time with Neural Network depth. This additional
side channel information obtained, namely the depth of the
network, reduces the search space for finding the substitute
model with functionality close to the target model.
To efficiently search for the optimal Neural Network, an
optimisation problem is introduced which is solved using
Reinforcement Learning based Neural Architecture Search. A
Recurrent Neural Network(RNN) controller predicts a new
substitute architecture, whose performance determines the
reward to improve the controller’s prediction for subsequent
optimisation epochs [44]. The optimisation problem involves
minimising the loss function computed between the predicted
labels of the substitute model and the target model instead
of the true labels [13]. This ensures that the substitute model
learns to mimic the predictions of the target model and hence,
increasing the similarity of the two models. Over multiple
epochs of training, the RNN controller updates its parameters
based on the reward obtained by minimising the loss, to
predict optimal substitute architectures with performance close
to target model. The proposed architecture search and recon-
struction technique can be used with other attack approaches
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Fig. 1: Model Extraction using Timing Side Channels. 1) The
adversary queries the target model by sending an input; 2) Adversary
measures the execution time of the target model for the provided
input; 3) The execution time is passed to the adversary’s regressor
model which predicts the depth of the target model; 4) The depth
of the Neural Network is used to reduce the search space for the
architecture search; 5) Architecture Search produces the optimal
architecture using Reinforcement Learning within the constrained
search space which has very close test accuracy as the target model.
as well, like cache side channel attacks [15][43].
The proposed approach assumes a weak adversary with only
black box access to the target Neural Network and requires
a constant number of queries to infer the Neural Network
depth independently of the architecture size. Further, the
objective function of Reinforcement Learning maximises the
test accuracy of the proposed Neural Network which ensures
that the final substitute Neural Network is optimal and close
to the target model.
Evaluation. To measure the success of the proposed model
extraction attack, the performance of the regressor to correctly
infer the depth of the Neural Network given the total execution
time is shown. The performance of different regressors, to
infer the Neural Network depth has been assessed based
on the R2 score and the Mean Squared Error to select the
regressor model which captures the maximum variance and
accuracy. From the results, ensemble based regressors like
random forrest and boosted decision trees outperform their
linear counterparts: Ridge regression, Support Vector Machine
(SVM) and decision trees. This is followed by the evaluation
of the Reinforcement Learning based architecture search by
comparing the test accuracy of the reconstructed model with
the target model accuracy. The experiments are performed
using deep convolutional Neural Networks similar to VGG ar-
chitectures [34]. The proposed Reinforcement Learning based
architecture search technique can generate a model with test
accuracy within 5% of the target model.
Main Contributions. The paper makes the following main
contributions:
• Shows that Neural Networks are vulnerable to timing
side channel attacks as Neural Network architectures with
different depth have different execution time (Section V).
• Proposes a novel attack to infer the depth of the Neural
Network using timing side channels in constant number
of queries in a black box setting (Section VI).
• Proposes an efficient search technique to reconstruct
an optimal substitute architecture using Reinforcement
Learning while ensuring functionality similar to the target
model (Section VII).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Networks
Let (x, y) be the data points obtained by sampling from a
probability distribution D over the space X of input feature
values and space Y of output labels. The goal of machine
learning algorithms is to learn the mapping from X to Y
captured by a function f : X → Y . The associated loss
function lf : X × Y → R captures the error made by
the prediction f(x) when the true label is y. Deep Learn-
ing, a subset of machine learning algorithms, uses Deep
Neural networks modelled as function fh(x, θ) where θ are
the parameters optimised during training to obtain minimum
expected loss under the constraint of the hyperparameters h.
The set of hyperparameters h includes the depth of the Neural
Network, stride and filter size of convolution and maxpool
layers and regularization hyperparameters. The performance of
the Neural Networks is measured by computing the accuracy
on test data in classification tasks.
B. Security and Privacy in Machine Learning
Machine learning is known to have several security and pri-
vacy issues in adversarial settings [8]. A major security threat
in Neural Networks is Adversarial examples, i.e, perturbed
data instances that fool the classifier into misclassifying the
image by either poisoning the training data or evading the
decision logic during inference [29]. For a Neural Network
function fh(x; θ) with input data point x and parameters θ,
an adversary can violate the confidentiality and privacy of
input data (x), training data, model parameters (θ) and the
model computation (fh(x; θ)). The privacy of input passed
to the model can be violated using model inversion attack
[9] by extracting the input when the adversary knows the
output, parameters and gradients. Another major class of
privacy attacks is Membership inference which violate the
privacy of individual members of the training dataset by
identifying whether a given data point is in the dataset or
not [32][31]. Further, the computation of the Neural Networks
leak information in the form of side channels which allow the
adversary to extract model details or inputs [3][40]. Machine
learning models can be extracted by adversary to reconstruct a
substitute model with similar functionality as the target model
and hence violating the intellectual property of the service
provider [38][40][39]. However, some of these attacks assume
that the underlying Neural Network architecture is known to
the adversary. Hence, extracting the target model architecture
enables the adversary to mount further security and privacy
attacks.
Implementation and physical characteristics of systems ex-
pose information about the underlying computation which can
be extracted in the form of side channels. Power consumption
and Timing side channels are some common manifestations
of side channel attacks overlooked during system design.
While side channels like power channels are accurate and
reveal significant information about the target architecture,
they require expensive equipment and probes to monitor and
measure the power [22]. Timing Channels arise when the
program uses conditional statements dependent on the secret
information which influences the runtime or when the access
timing correlates strongly with the program locality dependent
on the secret [21].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Model Extraction. Given a black box access to a target
Neural Network ftarget, the goal of the adversary is to search
for a substitute Neural Network fsubstitute ∈ S, where S
is the search space for all possible Neural Network models
with different hyperparameters, such that the functionality
of ftarget approximates fsubstitute using minimum possible
queries. The metric used to measure the functionality of the
models, fsubstitute and ftarget, is the test accuracy (Rtest). In
other words, the objective is to minimize the difference in test
accuracy Rtest =
1
|D|
∑
(x,y)∈D d(ftarget(x), fsubstitute(x))
between the two models ftarget and fsubstitute for inputs (x, y)
sampled from the data (D), i.e, (x, y)
i.i.d
∼ D and a given
distance function d between the two inputs.
Exploiting Timing Side Channels. To reduce the entropy
of search space of possible Neural Network models and make
the search more efficient, the adversary exploits the timing side
channels to infer the number of layers from the total execution
time. For this, the adversary collects a dataset (DA) with
execution time (T ) and Neural Network depth (K) for various
models by varying the number of parameters. Formally, given
the attacker dataset DA = {(T1,K1), · · · , (TN ,KN )} of i.i.d.
random variables, for a given depth of the target Neural
Network (k) from the total execution time (t), the adversary
estimates the regression function R(k) = E{K|T = t}.
Model Search. The estimated depth is used to constraint the
search space to Sk which is the set of all the Neural Network
models of depth k. This allows the adversary to search for the
substitute model fsubstitute in the search space Sk instead of
search space S where Sk ⊂ S. However, the search space Sk
is parameterised by kernel size, stride and number of filters
which still make the search space large. To make the search
space tractable, the adversary uses Reinforcement Learning
paradigm where the accuracy of the target model is included
in the objective function as part of the reward, to search for
Neural Networks with higher test accuracy.
IV. THREAT MODEL
Setting. There are two settings for machine learning in
adversarial setting: white box and black box, based on the
adversary’s knowledge about the target system. In white box
setting, the adversary has access to the underlying data, learn-
ing algorithms, architecture of the model, training parameters
and target model architectures which allows the adversary to
compute the output of the intermediate layers. The proposed
attack is in a black box setting where the adversary is weak
and does not have access to the model internals and can only
query the trained model and obtain the corresponding output
predictions.
Hardware. The proposed attack is an inference phase
attack, where the trained target model has been deployed as
a service to the users. During inference, CPUs and Neural
Network accelerators are extensively used while GPUs are
used for training Neural Network architectures [37]. Majority
of machine learning Cloud service providers use CPUs [12].
The attack is evaluated using CPUs but the approach can
be extended to other hardware accelerators as well. The
adversary requires the same processor as the target model
which can be openly obtained in most of the ML as a Service
(MLaaS) platforms like Amazon Sagemaker and Facebook
which heavily rely on CPUs for the inference and provide
the hardware specifications [1][2]. The target hardware or the
service can be purchased by adversary to run the queries and
generate the attack dataset which is a one time operation and
done as part of the setup phase for the attack.
Data. The attack assumes a weak adversary with no knowl-
edge about the training data and only knows the input-output
dimensions and range of values they can take. The attacker,
however, is assumed to know the underlying data distribution
from which the training data was sampled. This allows the
attacker to sample data points as inputs and pass them to the
target model for predictions. There are two main approaches
to reconstruct the training data for the substitute model:
Iterative membership inference attacks and data reconstruction
attacks. In case of membership inference attack, the adversary
samples data points from the underlying data distribution
x ∼ D which is passed as a query to the target model
from which the adversary obtains the model output posterior
f(x). Given the output posterior of the model for the input,
the attacker checks if the value of the maximum posterior
is greater than a threshold(x ∈ DT ) or not(x 6∈ DT ) [31].
This is done iteratively by sampling data points and using
membership inference attacks to reconstruct the training data
used by the target Neural Network. In data reconstruction
attack, an adversary uses a generative adversarial network to
reconstruct training data samples from target model by finding
the approximate training data distribution [30][10]. Either of
the two approaches can be used to reconstruct the dataset and
it is a one time operation done during the setup phase of the
attack as described in Section VI.
V. TIMING CHANNELS IN NEURAL NETWORKS
There exists a direct relation between execution time of
Neural Networks and their dependence on various hyper-
parameters for different Neural Network layers as shown
in this section. This dependence of the execution time on
the Neural Network hyperparameters allows an adversary to
infer the architecture details using the total execution time
which forms the basis of the attack. A typical Convolutional
Neural Network has three types of layers based on operations:
convolution layer, maxpool layer and fully connected layer and
each of the layer has stride, kernel size and number of filter
as the hyperparameters.
Convolution Layer. Convolution is a weighted sum opera-
tion which computes the multiplication of the parameters (θ
(l)
ij )
of layer l and the input feature map (zl−1ij ) and adds the results,
x
(l)
i =
∑
i
∑
j θ
(l)
ij ×z
(l−1)
ij . The execution time of convolution
layers is proportional to the number of multiplications (shown
in Figure 2(a)) which is given by: ow×oh× co×fw×fh× ci
where ow and oh are the output matrix width and height, ci
and co are the input and output number of channels and fh
and fw represent the filter width and filter height.
Maxpool Layer. Maxpool computes the maximum of the
k×k region of preceding layer feature map where k is the size
of the kernel. Hence, the computation of maxpool depends on
the number of filters of the feature map and the kernel size
(k). The execution time increases with increasing filter size
and increasing kernel size as shown in Figure 2 (b). For stride,
there is an inverse relation between the execution time and the
stride as shown in Figure 2 (c). The output size decreases with
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Fig. 2: (a) Convolution Layer: Total Execution Time increases linearly with kernel size and filter size; (b) Maxpool Layer: Total Exeuction
Time increases linearly with kernel and filter size; (c) Maxpool Layer: Total Execution Time decreases with increase in stride.
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Fig. 3: (a) Fully Connected Layer: Total Execution time varies linearly with the total number of multiplications between the weights of the
current layer and the input from the previous layer; (b) Simple Neural Networks Topology: Total Execution Time varies linearly with the
number of layers of the neural network architecture; (c) Complex Neural Networks Topology: Total Execution Time varies linearly with the
number of layers of the neural network with skip connections between different layers.
increasing stride which results in a decrease in the execution
time due to fewer number of multiplications.
Fully Connected Layer. Fully connected layer performs
a matrix vector multiplication between the parameters of the
Neural Network and the input image map. Formally, the matrix
vector multiplication of parameters θ
(l)
ij for layer l with the
activation of previous layer z
(l−1)
j is given by x
(l)
i =
∑
j θ
(l)
ij ×
z
(l−1)
j . Given two fully connected layers of input nodesm and
output nodes n, the execution time varies linearly with the total
number of multiplications, m× n and the linear relation can
be seen in Figure 3 (a).
Variation with Depth. Neural Networks are embarrassingly
parallel and all the computations in one layer can be executed
in parallel to some extent which enables optimisations like
model and data parallelism to improve the performance [24].
However, due to sequential computation of Neural Networks,
the total execution time is the sum of the execution time of
individual layers. In Figure 3 (b) and Figure 3 (c), the execu-
tion time increases linearly with the increase in the network
architecture depth for both simple and complex topologies.
The simple topologies of Neural Networks include LeNet,
AlexNet and VGG architectures while the complex topologies
include Resnet architectures which have skip connections
between the layers. This linear relation between the number
of layers and the total execution time forms the basis of the
attack methodology to infer the depth of the Neural Network
given the execution time.
Hardware Factors. While the Neural Networks fetch the
data and parameters from the memory, the program could
incur latencies during reading or storing data, contention of
threads and inefficient caching. Since the hardware used for
all the models is same, these factors are assumed to effect
the execution time of all the Neural Networks in the same
manner.
VI. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
Side channels reveal only a part of the secret in the target
system and identifying the rest of the secret is modelled as a
search problem [43]. The proposed attack is broadly divided
into three phases as shown in Figure 1:
• Setup Phase: Adversary aggregates the dataset by mea-
suring the execution time of multiple models with differ-
ent hyperparameters, on a particular hardware, to be used
in the actual attack. Further, the adversary reconstructs the
training dataset using iterative membership inference [31]
or dataset reconstruction attack [30]. This is a one time
operation required to be performed prior to the attack.
• Attack Phase: Adversary queries the target Neural Net-
work and measures the total execution time averaged over
all queries. A regressor is trained on the attacker dataset
which is used to infer the target Neural Network depth.
• Reconstruction Phase: Adversary searches for an op-
timal Neural Network with test accuracy close to that
of the target Neural Network model within the reduced
search space by making the depth of the Neural Network
constant as inferred from the attack.
A. Setup Phase
The adversary during the setup phase reconstructs the train-
ing data with the prediction of target model (ftargeti(x)) as
labels instead of true labels for model distillation and creates
a dataset containing the execution time of Neural Network
architectures with varying hyperparameters. This a one time
operation required prior to performing the attack.
Reconstructing Training Data. Since, the attack assumes
a weak adversary with no knowledge about the training data,
the adversary needs to identify and generate data samples used
as the training dataset. The underlying data distribution is
assumed to be known, the adversary can sample data points x
from the underlying data distribution. The adversary queries
the target model with data sample x, and based on the target
model output posterior, determines if the data sample belongs
to the training data DT of the target Neural Network or not, by
selecting a suitable threshold [31]. Given the knowledge of the
data samples used as part of the target model training dataset,
the adversary labels the input instances (x) with the predictions
of the target model (ftarget(x)) instead of the true label (y).
The aggregated training data (xi, ftarget(xi)) includes soft
target model predictions (ftarget(xi)) instead of hard labels
(y), which ensures that the substitute model learns to mimic
the functionality of the target model [13][5].
Creating Attack Model Timing Dataset. The adversary
populates the attack model dataset which contains the time
taken for inference and corresponding depth of the Neural
Networks along with the number of parameters for the corre-
sponding model as shown in Table I. Formally, for different
model architectures and depth (K), the attacker collects the
corresponding execution time (T ) to generate the attacker
dataset DA = {(T1,K1), · · · , (TN ,KN )}. This dataset is
specific to a particular hardware and the collected data can
then be used for stealing any model run on the same hardware.
Architecture Parameters Inference Time (s)
VGG16
138,357,544 0.59683408
156,053,800 0.86338694
133,048,360 0.49502961
VGG19
143,667,240 0.7642632
168,441,896 1.11189311
136,588,328 0.55131464
TABLE I: Sample of Adversary’s Dataset. Depth of the architecture
and the number of parameters as input features for the regressor.
B. Attack Phase
Query. The adversary sends queries to the target model and
computes the overall execution time averaged across all the
queries. For each additional query of model extraction attacks
proposed previously, a new bit of information is leaked which
reduces the entropy of the target black box model. However,
this requires a large number of queries due to the large number
of parameters of deep Neural Network architectures. In the
proposed attack, each of the query to the target model reveals
the same bit of information (execution time averaged across
all queries) which allows to make constant number of queries,
independent of the architecture.
Regression. The average execution time measured from the
target Neural Network (t) is used to estimate the depth of Neu-
ral Network (k) using regressor trained on the attack model
dataset created during the setup phase, R(k) = E{K|T = t}.
For current experiments, the attacker dataset for training the
regressor model is created using 100 Neural Networks with
different depth and parameters as shown in Figure 4.
C. Reconstruction Phase
The search space of all possible Neural Networks is very
large and complex due to which designing the Neural Network
manually is hard and requires optimal search strategies to
reduce and simplify the search space. The depth of the Neural
Network reduces the search space and the model exploration
is automated using Reinforcement Learning which outputs the
best model architecture in the constrained search space [44].
A Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) based controller predicts
the hyperparameters of each layer in the template Neural
Network sampled using the reward from the previous proposed
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Fig. 4: Scatter Plot of the Adversary’s Dataset. Execution time vs
Number of layers. Each point in the plot is obtained by varying the
parameters of the neural network layers and the number of layers in
the neural network. The attacker fits a regressor to predict the depth
of the neural network given the execution time.
architecture. The parameters of controller RNN θc are then
optimised based on performance of the predicted architecture
using policy gradient method.
Formally, the controller predicts the architectures through
actions a1:T and the predicted model tries to achieve accuracy
R which is used to compute the reward signal to train the
controller. The policy function maps the proposed architec-
ture to a real number (accuracy) which is used to compute
the reward for the RNN controller. The policy weights are
optimised to ensure that newer architectures proposed by the
RNN controller have a higher performance. After training the
RNN controller for multiple iterations, the proposed substitute
architecture is optimal, i.e, has the highest expected accuracy
among all the models within the search space. The goal is to
maximise the expected accuracy of sampled architecture given
by,
J(θc) = EP (a1:T ;θc)[R] (1)
while minimising the difference in test accuracy between the
target and proposed substitute model, R
target
test −R
substitute
test .
Since the reward signal R is non-differentiable, we need
to use a policy gradient method to iteratively update the
parameters of the RNN controller θc. This work uses the
REINFORCE algorithm to directly update the policy
weights using stochastic gradient ascent and improve the
policy [41]:
▽θc J(θc) =
T∑
t=1
EP (a1:T ;θc)
[
▽θc logP (at|a(t−1):1; θc)R
]
(2)
The training of each proposed model is done using knowl-
edge distillation where the loss function for training the
substitute model is the distillation L2 loss function [13]
between the substitute model predictions (ytemplate) and target
model(ytarget) predictions instead of the true labels(y) for a
given data point x ǫ D and is given as,
L =
n∑
i=1
(
y
target
i − y
template
i
)2
(3)
Target Model
Substitute Model
RNN Controller
Loss
L(ysubstitute, ytarget) ➋
ytarget
ysubstitute➊
➌
Fig. 5: Reinforcement Learning Based Architecture Search with
Distillation. 1) The Recurrent Neural Network controller proposes a
Neural Network architecture by selecting values from the state search
space based on the the reward from the previous iteration; 2) The
proposed model trains by using the predictions of the target model as
the output predictions and mimics the behaviour of the target model
[13][5]; 3) The loss of the template and target model predictions is
used to compute a reward which is sent to the controller to predict
a better performing model
For each iteration of training the substitute model, the substi-
tute model learns to mimic the predictions of the target model
making the test performance similar (Figure 5).
VII. EVALUATION
Data. For all the experiments, CIFAR10 dataset [23] is used
which contains 60,000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes with
around 6000 images per class and the classes are mutually
exclusive. For training, 50,000 images are used while 10,000
images are used for testing.
Experiment Setup. The processor used for evaluation and
experimentation is Intel Xeon Gold 5115 server processor
with a 2.4GHz clock speed, 196GB of main memory and 40
cores. All the reported number are an average of 20 inference
runs. Accurate timing of the Neural Network inference is
done using process time() from the time() python library
which computes the time interval for running the inference
using the CPU counter and is not effected by execution of
other unrelated processes. The clock has a tick rate (ticks/s)
of 10,000,000 which indicates a high resolution of 1e-07.
A. Regression
Ideally, on executing a Neural Network on a hardware
accelerator, the total execution time depends solely on the
number of layers due to their sequential computation. Hence,
varying the number of neurons or filters in a particular layer
in a deep Neural Network should not change the overall
execution time as individual computations within the same
layer can be performed in parallel. This property of Neural
Networks makes them embarrassingly parallel [37]. However,
in practice, a variation in number of parameters within a
particular layer shows a deviation in execution time due to
inefficient parallelism as seen in Figure 4.
To address this, it is important to train a good regressor
which captures the maximum variance in the timing dataset.
A good regressor should be able to capture and explain the
variance of the dataset through its predictions and generalize
well over the data samples. The evaluation of five different
regressor models on the attacker dataset is done using R2 score
metric to measure the variance explained by the model and the
mean squared error (MSE) to measure the error in estimating
the depth of the network.
Ridge and Support Vector regressors are linear models,
while Decision Tree Regressor builds a tree structure over
different features in the dataset by minimising the standard
deviation. Boosting is an ensemble technique to combine mul-
tiple sequential decision trees and fit the data, while improving
the error from the pervious model. On the other hand, Random
Forest regressor fits subsets of data over multiple decision trees
independently and outputs the mean of prediction from each
of the model.
Based on the results, ensemble approaches like boosted
decision trees (BDT) and random forrest (RF) regressor have a
higher R2 score and lower mean squared error to estimate the
depth more accurately as compared to the linear models which
fail to capture the variance of the attacker dataset (Table IV).
The estimated depth of the ensemble regressors on the target
deep Neural Networks from the corresponding execution time
on VGG based target Neural Network architectures is shown
in Table II. Since the output of the regressor is a continuous
variable, the prediction of the regressor is rounded to the
nearest larger integer. For all the three Neural Networks used
Architecture Parameters Execution Time Predicted Depth True Depth
Model 1 [32(3), 32(3), MP, 64(3), 64(3), MP, 128(3), 128(3), MP] 309,290 0.036057 8.8 (RF); 8.1 (BDT) 9
Model 2 [32(3), 32(3), MP, 64(3), 64(3), MP, 128(3), 128(3), MP, 256(3), MP] 595,242 0.10738 10.15 (RF); 10.02 (BDT) 11
Model 3 [32(3), 32(3), MP, 64(3), 64(3), MP, 128(3), 128(3), 128(3), MP, 256(3), 256(3), MP] 1,334,442 0.18594 12.8 (RF); 12.6 (BDT) 13
TABLE II: Regression Model Predictions. The estimated depth of the neural network is rounded to nearest larger integer. The depth is
correctly estimated using ensemble regressors: Random Forest (RF) and Boosted Decision Trees (BDT). The architecture of the model is in
format: filters (kernel size) and MP is the Maxpool Layer
Reconstructed Architecture Parameters Original Accuracy Reconstruction Accuracy
Model 1 [64(3), 32(5), 128(3), 64(5), 128(3), 64(5), 32(5), 128(3), GAP] 535,114 88.03% 86.06%
Model 2 [32(5), 32(5), 64(3), 32(3), 64(5), 128(3), 128(3), 32(3), 64(3), 64(5), GAP] 639,978 89.26% 85.65%
Model 3 [64(3), 128(3), 128(3), 32(5), 64(5), 128(3), 128(3), 32(3), 128(5), 128(3), 64(5), 128(5), GAP] 889,834 90.19% 85.3%
TABLE III: Evaluation of Reconstructed Models using Reinforcement Learning. The test accuracy of the reconstructed model is close
to the original accuracy of the target model. The architecture of the model is in format: filters (kernel size) and GAP is the Global Average
Pooling
for evaluation, the regressors estimate the correct depth from
the total execution time.
Regressor Mean Squared Error R2 Score
Support Vector 7.5405 0.7295
Decision Tree 5.375 0.80719
Linear (Ridge) 4.46533 0.8398
Boosted Decision Tree 4.1947 0.8495
Random Forrest 3.7664 0.8648
TABLE IV: Evaluation of Regression Models using R2 score
and Mean Squared Error (MSE). Ensemble approaches estimate
the depth better with higher R2 score and lower MSE.
B. Reconstruction using Reinforcement Learning
Once the adversary has estimated the depth of the Neural
Network, the information is used to reduce the search space.
Now, the adversary has to search for the optimal substitute
Neural Network with test accuracy close to the target Neural
Network.
The Reinforcement Learning based architecture search is
evaluated by fixing the depth of the model architectures
inferred using the regressor. The search is further constrained
by specifying the convolutional layer parameter range for
the kernel size (k) ǫ {3,5} and the number of filter (nf )
ǫ {32,64,128} which are commonly used hyperparameters
values used in all state of the art networks [34]. The archi-
tecture search approach explores the space of 50 models, and
outputs the architecture corresponding the highest accuracy. To
improve the performance of the substitute model, we use fully
convolutional net architecture by replacing maxpool layer with
convolutional layers with higher stride [35]. The reward used
for updating the controller is the maximum validation accuracy
of the last 5 epochs cubed which is clipped in the range (-
0.05, 0.05) to ensure that the gradients do not overshoot. The
controller RNN includes 1 LSTM cell and 32 hidden units
and each proposed template model is trained for 20 epochs.
For all the three model, the test accuracy of the substitute
model generated is within 5% of the target model architecture
as shown in Table III.
VIII. MITIGATION
The main reason for the manifestation of timing side
channels in Neural Networks is the sequential computation of
layers which determine the total execution time. It is important
to design Neural Networks resistant to timing side channels to
prevent model extraction. Some of the possible defences are
discussed in this section.
Adding Noise to Execution Time. Instead of having a
Neural Network with timing dependent on the depth of the
Neural Network, one defence mechanism is to design Neural
Networks without the dependency of the execution time on
the number of layers and hyperparameters. Additional noise
to the total execution time can be added in the form of latency
by including dummy computations and layers. However, this
results in a model security and utility tradeoff which is a con-
cern in real time critical applications where the performance
of the model within time constraints is vital.
Adversarial Machine Learning. The second mechanism is
a training phase defence where the attack and defence game
can be viewed as an adversarial machine learning problem.
The goal of the attacker is to fit the best possible curve or
function to the attacker dataset for regression while the goal of
the defender is to poison the dataset with wrong data instances
such that the regressor makes wrong predictions. The defender
injects adversarial examples with incorrect timing and depth
values resulting in incorrect regressor estimation.
IX. DISCUSSION
Variation Across Datasets. The timing distribution for
Neural Networks is specific to the training data used. For the
same architecture, using different datasets results in different
execution time due to different number of computations as
shown in Table V.
Architecture Dataset Inference Time (s)
Alexnet
MNIST 0.28958
CIFAR10 0.36527
VGG
MNIST 0.44178
CIFAR10 0.63833
TABLE V: Same architecture trained on different datasets have
different timing distribution.
Different dataset have images of different sizes and proper-
ties due to which the intermediate input feature maps require
different number of multiplications. For instance, MNIST
dataset has images of size 28 × 28 × 1, while CIFAR10
dataset has images of size 32 × 32 × 3 which results in
difference in number of computations to be performed. Hence,
the regressor is specific to a particular timing distribution
unique to a dataset and a different attack model has to be
trained to fit different timing distribution.
Extending to Remote Setting. While the evaluation the
attack is on a local model, this can be extended to remote
setting like in MLaaS where the model is deployed on a Cloud
server. The total round trip time in case of remote setting also
includes some additional noise during propagation in the form
of jitter as well as the time taken for network propagation [7].
A round trip time model for remote timing attacks is given
below where the total response time (tres) is a linear function
of the scaled processing time (tproc), network propagation time
(tnet) and the jitter.
tres = a× tproc + tnet + jitter (4)
To extract the processing time of the Neural Network from
the total round trip time, the additional network time and jitter
have to be estimated and filter them from the round trip time.
Model Extraction Defences. Several defences have been
proposed to mitigate the attacks that exploit the information
from output predictions. Suppressing the information provided
by output logits reduces the accuracy of the substitute model
but degrades the utility [38]. Stateful defence mechanism to
monitor and detect a variation in the input query distribution
[19] or raise an alert if the information gained by an adversary
exceeds a threshold [20]. Trusted hardware like Intel SGX
can protect the confidentiality and integrity of the model by
moving the model offline to the user’s system [11]. For attacks
that rely on memory access patterns, implementation using
Oblivious RAM could help to hide the access pattern [36].
All the defences mentioned are proposed for attacks that use
the output prediction scores but none of these approaches can
help to mitigate timing side channels.
X. RELATED WORK
Deep Neural Network attributes can be extracted from the
input-output relationship of the target network [33][28]. For
example, given a black box neural network, an adversary
queries the model with data instances x to obtain correspond-
ing output predictions f(x). These input-output pair (x,f(x))
is used for training the substitute model, whose parameters
and hyperparameters can be computed by solving a system of
linear equations between the input, output predictions and the
unknown parameters [38]. Further, other hyperparameters of
the objective function can be solved by finding an approxi-
mate solution to a system of overdetermined equations [39].
Unfortunately, such attacks rely on large number queries since
each new query provides the solution for a different unknown
variable. Further, for very deep neural network architectures
with large number of layers and millions of parameters, the
computation cost is high. Unlike these attacks, timing side
channels can be exploited in constant number of queries since
each query reveals the same model attribute and the approach
is scalable to deep networks with millions of parameters.
Several machine learning models trained to predict the
model attributes based on the input output relationships can
infer significant number of model attributes [27]. However,
such techniques incur a high computational cost for training
large number of machine learning attack models. For a simple
digit classification task, it takes 10k attack models trained over
40 GPU days.
Alternatively, Side Channel leakage during the model execu-
tion provides fine-grained information about the target model
in the form of cache misses, memory access pattern [26][16],
power consumption profile [3] and hardware performance
counters [4]. The read-after-write dependencies for the inputs
activation filters and output activation filters are different
which reveal the dimensions and type of individual layers
[17]. Assuming shared resources between the target model
(victim)process and the attacker process, an adversary can
monitor the number of calls, the size of matrix dimensions
to identify the number of layers and hyperparameter details in
the Neural Network [15]. Further, cache attacks can distinguish
different activation function like relu, sigmoid and tanh by
monitoring the probe addresses [43]. Given the power traces
during the execution of models, algorithms like differen-
tial power analysis, correlated power analysis and horizontal
power analysis can be used to extract the the number of
parameters in each layers, values of each parameters, total
number of layers and the type of activation function [3].
However, these side channel attacks either assume a strong
adversary with physical access to the hardware or require
shared resources between the processes. Unlike these side
channel attacks, the proposed approach considers a weak
adversary with (remote) blackbox access to the target model.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that Neural Networks are vulnerable
to timing side channels attacks as the total execution time
depends on the sequential computation along the number of
layers or depth. For a weak adversary in a black box setting,
the timing channel vulnerability can be exploited to infer the
depth of the Neural Network architecture. The evaluation of
various regressors on the timing data shows that the ensemble
based regressors perform better than their linear counterparts
based on the R2 score and Mean Score Error values. Further,
the search problem of extracting a Neural Network architecture
by exploiting side channels can be addressed efficiently using
Reinforcement Learning. This approach can be used with
other attacks like cache attacks and memory access pattern
monitoring to accurately identify the substitute model close to
the target model. The attack is evaluated on VGG like deep
learning architectures and it is shown that a substitute model
can be reconstructed within 5% of the test accuracy of the
target Neural Network.
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